Abstract-An announcement scheme is a system that facilitates vehicles to broadcast road-related information in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) in order to improve road safety and efficiency. In this paper, we propose a privacy-aware reputationbased announcement scheme that provides message reliability evaluation, auditability, and robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
We call a system that facilitates vehicles to exchange messages about vehicle, road, and traffic conditions in a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) an announcement scheme. If messages exchanged are reliable (reflecting reality) then the driving environment may become safer and more efficient. Unreliable messages, possibly due to hardware malfunction or driver malicious intention, may result in various consequences from journey delay to accident. Hence, an announcement should have the following functionalities: 1) message reliability evaluation -vehicles should be able to evaluate the reliability of messages received, and 2) auditability -vehicles that broadcast unreliable messages should be identified and revoked. In addition, an announcement scheme should satisfy the following security requirements: 3) robustness -its performance should not be affected by attacks from adversaries, and 4) privacy awareness -the privacy of vehicles should be protected, since messages may contain data private to vehicle users. Vehicle privacy has two facets:
• Anonymity. The identity of a vehicle should not be revealed from messages broadcast by the vehicle.
• Unlinkability. Multiple messages broadcast by the same vehicle should not be linked to each other.
Li et al. [13] proposed a reputation-based announcement scheme that aims to provide message reliability evaluation, auditability, and robustness. This scheme relies on a centralised reputation system with an off-line trusted authority. In this scheme the reliability of a message is evaluated according to the reputation of the vehicle that generates this message. The message is considered reliable if the vehicle has a sufficiently high reputation. The reputation reflects the extent to which the vehicle has announced reliable messages in the past. It is This paper is partially supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China, Project 61063003.
computed and updated based on feedback reported by other vehicles. The reputation scores of all vehicles are managed by a trusted central authority. A vehicle periodically retrieves its reputation certificate, which contains its reputation score, from the central authority. When a vehicle broadcasts a message it attaches its reputation certificate to the message, which allows a receiving vehicle to infer the reliability of the message. The central authority revokes a vehicle whose reputation score decreases beyond a threshold by no longer providing a new reputation certificate.
This approach features the important performance advantage of immediate evaluation: upon receiving a message a receiving vehicle is able to immediately evaluate its reliability. This enables the receiving vehicle to respond quickly. In a scheme that does not support immediate evaluation, such as [6, 7, 12, 15, 18] , a receiving vehicle has to wait until sufficient information is received from other vehicles before the message reliability can be evaluated accurately. However, the scheme in [13] overlooks privacy: messages and feedback are linkable and not anonymous. This drawback may affect vehicles' willingness to participate.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold: 1) we generalise the scheme in [13] and propose an abstraction that we will refer to as the basic scheme, and 2) we provide vehicle privacy for the basic scheme.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We discuss related work in Section II. In Section III we describe the basic scheme. We then elaborate and analyse our privacy-aware scheme in Section IV. In Section V, we discuss other properties of our privacy-aware schemes and some related issues. We conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of announcement schemes proposed to evaluate the reliability of messages in VANETs. These can be categorised into two main groups: the threshold method and the reputation-based method.
A majority of announcement schemes, e.g. [6, 7, 12, 15, 18] , use the threshold method: a message is believed reliable if it has been announced by multiple distinct vehicles whose number exceeds a threshold within a time interval. This method is only suitable for messages that can be broadcast by multiple vehicles. It is not suitable for messages that may be broadcast by only one vehicle, such as beacons, which contain the current position, speed, and direction of the broadcasting vehicle [10] . In addition, this method also gives rise to the problem of distinguishability of message origin [9] -how to tell if two messages are made by two distinct vehicles if vehicles are anonymous and their activities are unlinkable. Solutions include using a message-linked group signature [18] and onetime anonymous authentication [17] .
In addition to [13] there have been several announcement schemes based on reputation systems, such as [8, 14, 16] . These schemes adopt a decentralised infrastructure. In [8] , the reliability of a message is gauged by verifying opinions appended to the message by other vehicles, which may be a heavy computational burden. In [14] , reliability is either role-based (certain types of vehicles such as traffic patrol are more trustworthy), majority-based (similar to the threshold method), or experience-based (trust is established from past interactions). The scheme of [16] uses current observations and past behaviour to determine trustworthiness. Both [16] and the experienced-based scheme may be problematic in a large VANET environment where vehicles generally do not have long-term relationships. Storing all this information may also be a problem. In all these schemes, neither robustness against collusion of adversaries nor privacy are provided. It is also not clear how rogue vehicles are revoked.
Compared with existing threshold and reputation-based schemes, the scheme [13] features: 1) immediate evaluation of reliability of messages (including beacons), 2) revocation of malicious vehicles, 3) robustness against both external and internal adversaries, and 4) a good level of efficiency. However, the scheme in [13] does not provide privacy protection for vehicles.
This paper provides a generalisation of the scheme in [13] , based on which we propose a privacy-aware announcement scheme that additionally provides a good level of privacy protection for vehicles.
III. THE BASIC SCHEME
In this section, we describe an abstraction of the scheme in [13] (see Figure 1 ). This has a centralised architecture with off-line central authorities. We assume that vehicles are mobile entities equipped with short-range wireless communication devices. They: 1) generate and broadcast messages, 2) receive messages and evaluate their reliability, and 3) report feedback. There are two logical off-line central authorities: a reputation server (RS ), and an administrative server (AS ). The RS computes reputation for vehicles based on feedback reported by vehicles. The AS : 1) enrols new vehicles and revokes malicious vehicles, 2) provides vehicles with reputation endorsement, and 3) collects feedback from vehicles. We assume that the AS has multiple remote wireless communication interfaces to intermittently communicate with vehicles in a convenient and frequent manner (for example once a day). Note that we do not require constant communication between a vehicle and the AS . We assume that the RS and AS are trusted, and communication between the RS and AS is secure (authenticated, confidential, and integrity protected). We assume that each of the vehicles and the AS has a clock, and the clock of a vehicle is loosely synchronised with that of the AS . We also assume that the communication between the AS and a vehicle, and those between vehicles, are public and thus subject to attacks. 
A. Protocols and Algorithms Required
This basic scheme requires:
• A secure mutual authentication protocol MEA, which provides both communicating parties with assurance of: 1) each other's identity, and 2) freshness of communication. We denote by MEA{A → B : m} the message m sent from A to B after the assurances of MEA have been established. Vehicles will use MEA as part of reputation retrieval and feedback reporting. MEA can be instantiated by any suitable authentication protocol.
• A secure two-origin authentication protocol TOA. If A broadcasts a message (m 1 , m 2 ), TOA provides a receiver with assurance that: 1) m 1 originates from A, 2) m 2 originates from a third party C, and 3) m 2 is associated with A. We denote by TOA{A : m 1 , m 2 : C} the message (m 1 , m 2 ) sent by A with the assurances of TOA provided. Vehicles will use TOA to broadcast messages. TOA can easily be implemented using, for example, a digital signature scheme.
• An aggregation algorithm Aggr. The RS will use it to aggregate feedback and produce reputation for vehicles.
• A feedback analysis algorithm Detect. The RS will use it to identify malicious vehicles from feedback.
• A decreasing function TimeDiscount that takes input a time difference and outputs a value in [0, 1], and TimeDiscount(0) = 1.
• A threshold Ψ in [0, 1], to determine whether a reputation score is sufficiently high.
B. Description of the Basic Scheme
The basic scheme consists of the following protocols:
Scheme initialisation. The scheme is initialised as follows: 1) the AS installs MEA and TOA, generates any keys required; 2) the AS regulates its clock, and deploys its remote wireless communication interfaces; and 3) the RS creates a database, and installs Aggr and Detect.
Vehicle registration. The AS registers a new vehicle V as follows: 1) generates keys to be used by V , 2) installs MEA, TOA, TimeDiscount in V and securely sends V with Ψ and the keys, and 3) requests RS to create a record in its database for V . Vehicle revocation. The RS periodically uses Detect on all feedback stored in the database to identify malicious vehicles, and reports to the AS . The AS revokes them by no longer providing them with reputation credentials.
C. Robustness of the Basic Scheme
The robustness of this scheme can be evaluated with respect to the following attacks: 1) message fraud: an adversary deceives a vehicle into believing that a false message m ′ is reliable, and 2) reputation manipulation: an adversary unfairly inflates or deflates the reputation of a vehicle.
We categorise adversaries into two groups: 1) external adversaries who attack the system without joining as legitimate vehicles, and 2) internal adversaries who are legitimate vehicles that attack the system.
In order to perpetrate a message fraud attack, an adversary could: a) impersonate a registered vehicle to retrieve a reputation credential and then broadcast false messages, or b) forge a legitimate broadcast message. In order to conduct reputation manipulation, an adversary could: c) impersonate a registered vehicle to report feedback. An adversary cannot perform a)-c) if MEA and TOA are secure and the AS and vehicles manage their secret keys appropriately.
In addition, an internal adversary can conduct message fraud by broadcasting a false message itself. This however will result in a decrease in its reputation, and excessive message frauds will eventually get itself revoked from the system. An internal adversary can also conduct reputation manipulation by providing false feedback itself, either in isolation or in collusion with other internal adversaries. There are several approaches to prevent this: 1) proof of spatial proximity: a receiving vehicle has to prove to the AS its distance from the sending vehicle when receiving the message, allowing only neighbouring vehicles (those indeed receive the message from the sending vehicle) to report feedback; 2) permanent identity: vehicle identity is permanent, to prevent identity change; 3) secret key binding: the secret keys of a vehicle are known to only the vehicle itself, to prevent colluding internal adversaries from acting on behalf of each other; and 4) data mining: the AS can analyse received feedbacks to detect malicious feedback. We do not specify any concrete techniques in this basic scheme in order to make it inclusive of any possible techniques (in [13] some instantiations are provided).
D. Privacy Unawareness of the Basic Scheme
However in this basic scheme neither MEA nor TOA provides anonymity or unlinkability. We now propose a privacyaware announcement scheme that realises privacy aware MEA and TOA.
IV. PRIVACY-AWARE ANNOUNCEMENT SCHEME
In this section we describe our privacy-aware announcement scheme (See Figure 2 ). We require:
• A secure group signature scheme [1, 4, 5] , denoted by GS = (GKeyGen, GJoin, GSign, GVerify, Open) where GKeyGen, GJoin, GSign, GVerify and Open denote group public key generation, group member secret key generation, group member signing, group verification, and signer revealing algorithms, respectively. A group signature scheme has the following properties: 1) each group member can sign messages; 2) a receiver can verify whether the signature was signed by a group member, but cannot discover which group member signed it; 3) any two messages signed by a group member cannot be linked; and 4) a signature can be "opened" by a group manager to reveal the signer of the message. We will use GS to realise a privacy-aware TOA, denoted by TOA + (we will show how TOA + is achieved later).
• A secure probabilistic encryption scheme [3, 11] the same plaintext using the same encryption key twice yields two different ciphertexts which are statistically indistinguishable. We will use PE to realise a privacyaware MEA, denoted by MEA + , by combination of PE and MEA: MEA + {V → AS : m} = PE{MEA{V → AS : m}}.
A. Description of the Privacy-aware Scheme
In this section, we specify the changes that our privacyaware scheme makes to the basic scheme:
Scheme Initialisation. In addition to Steps 2 and 3 of the basic scheme, our privacy-aware scheme requires that: 1) The AS installs GS, MEA + , TimeDiscount, and Ψ, and generates keys required.
2) The time is divided into intervals (T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , · · · ). For example, each time interval can be one day. For each interval T i , the AS uses GKeyGen to generate a group public key pk i and uses GJoin to generate a set of group member secret keys (sk Vehicle Registration. In addition to Step 3 of the basic scheme, our privacy-aware scheme requires the AS to: 1) generate the keys to be used by V for MEA + ; and 2) install MEA + , GSign, GVerify in V , and securely send V with the keys generated from the previous step and (pk 0 , pk 1 , pk 2 , · · · ).
Reputation Retrieval. When a vehicle V b drives into the proximity of a wireless communication interface during a time interval T i , whose beginning time is denoted by t i , it retrieves its reputation as follows: 1) V b and the AS execute MEA + to establish an encrypted and mutually authenticated channel; 2) upon retrieving (r, V b , t i ) from the RS , the AS computes (r Vehicle Revocation. In our privacy-aware scheme the AS revokes malicious vehicles by no longer providing them with new group member secret keys in the future.
In our scheme a reputation credential of V b at time interval T i is represented by a group member secret key: {r i) ). This gives a recipient assurance that m originated from a reputable (but unidentified) vehicle.
B. Privacy Analysis
In this section we analyse anonymity and unlinkability of our privacy-aware scheme. We focus on three protocols: reputation retrieval, message broadcast, and feedback reporting, since only in these protocols does a vehicle transmit data and thus potentially suffer in a privacy breach.
During reputation retrieval or feedback reporting, since the channel is protected by MEA + , the anonymity and unlinkability of all data sent by a vehicle is protected against all entities except for the AS . During message broadcast, θ is generated by using a group signature scheme, which protects anonymity and unlinkability against all entities except for the AS .
C. Robustness of Our Privacy-aware Scheme
Observe that our privacy-aware scheme still features the same robustness as the basic scheme against adversaries. First, an adversary is not able to impersonate an existing vehicle (just as in the basic scheme). In addition, an adversary is also not able to forge a legitimate broadcast message. This is because all group member signing keys are transmitted to vehicles via encrypted channels, and external adversaries are thus unable to obtain a valid group member secret key. In addition, all approaches that can be used in the basic scheme to prevent internal adversaries conducting reputation manipulation can also be used in our privacy-aware scheme.
V. DISCUSSION

A. Communication and Computational Overheads
In our proposed scheme, the main communication overhead is the signature θ. If we use the closely scrutinised BonehBoyen-Shacham (BBS) group signature scheme [4] , then θ can be 192 bytes (128 bytes if an additional assumption holds) with the security level approximately equivalent to 128-byte RSA signature [4] . The main computational overhead is the generation and verification of θ, in which the most expensive operations are one and two pairing operations, respectively. One pairing operation takes 3.6ms on an Athlon XP 2 GHz using code written in C++ [2] , meaning that generating and verifying θ takes approximately 3.6ms and 7.2ms, respectively. With the similar security level, the signatures in [13] take 96 bytes, and signing and verification take 2.1ms and 8.6ms, respectively. Thus, the computational cost is comparable between the two schemes while the communication cost of our scheme is greater.
B. Multiple Reputation Levels
Note that our privacy-aware scheme only supports a binary reputation. It can easily be extended to support multiple reputation levels with minimal modifications:
. During scheme initialisation, the AS will generate m group public keys for each time interval T i , denoted by pk i,1 , · · · , pk i,m . The AS will also generates m sets of group member secret keys (sk 
C. Secret Key Retrieval via an Un-encrypted Channel
In our scheme sk j i has to be transmitted via an encrypted channel, which imposes a constraint. This can be removed if we use the BBS scheme [4] . In this scheme a group public key includes g 1 , g 2 , two generators of (multiplicative) cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order p, respectively, and g 1 = ψ(g 2 ) for a computable isomorphism ψ from G 2 to G 1 . A group member secret key for member j is (A j , x j ) where A j = g 1/(γ+xj ) 1 , γ ∈ Z p is a secret of the signature authority, and x j ∈ Z p is only known to j and the signature authority.
By using the BBS scheme, the AS generates a group public key pk 0 and, for each vehicle V j , a group member secret key sk . The AS also assigns each time interval T i a random value h i ∈ G 1 \{g −1 1 }. The AS then derives pk i from pk 0 : the g 1 element of pk i equals g 1 ·h i , and other elements remain the same as those of pk 0 . Note that there always exists a computable isomorphism ψ i from G 2 to G 1 such that g 1 · h i = ψ i (g 2 ). The AS also computes a value h 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed an abstraction of the scheme in [13] , and layered on top of it a privacy-aware announcement scheme.
